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Abstract
The paper gives a soundness and completeness proof for the implicative frag-
ment of intuitionistic calculus with respect to the semantics of computability
logic, which understands intuitionistic implication as interactive algorithmic re-
duction. This concept — more precisely, the associated concept of reducibility —
is a generalization of Turing reducibility from the traditional, input/output sorts
of problems to computational tasks of arbitrary degrees of interactivity.
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1 Introduction
A quest for a convincing semantical explication of the constructivistic philosophy of
intuitionistic logic has been on for many decades. Among the most notable but
unsuccessful attempts in this direction are Kleene’s realizability [12], Go¨del’s Dialectica
interpretation [5] and Medvedev’s finite-problem semantics [16], directly or indirectly
stimulated by Kolmogorov’s [14] well known yet rather abstract thesis, according to
which intuitionistic logic is a logic of problems. A series of semantics in this style, while
meaningful and close in spirit to Kolmogorov’s vision, turned out to yield inherent in-
completeness. Blass’s appealing game semantics [1] which, by the way, happens to be
the nearest precursor of the semantics dealt with in the present paper,1 should also
be listed here. While the propositional fragment of intuitionistic logic was proven to
be sound with respect to it, the questions on predicate-level soundness and whatever-
level completeness have been left open for posterity. As for Lorenzen’s game semantics
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No.
0208816, and 2005 Summer Research Grant from Villanova University.
1A detailed discussion of how the two semantics compare is given in Sections 13 and 27 of [6].
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[3, 15], it has been seen as merely a technical servant to the existing syntactic con-
struction rather than meaningful and inspiring enough in its own right to provide an
ultimate justification for intuitionistic logic.
In [6] the author introduced a program and framework for redeveloping logic as
a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which it
has more traditionally been. At the heart of that approach, baptized as computability
logic (CL), is a game semantics. Games in CL are seen as formal equivalents of our
broadest intuition of computational problems, specifically, computational problems in
their most general — interactive — sense. Computability, or algorithmic solvability,
of such problems is understood as existence of an interactive Turing machine that
wins the game no matter how the other player, which is the environment or the user,
behaves. In this vision of logic, computability replaces the classical concept of truth,
operations on games=problems replace Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and the
understanding of logical formulas as (representing) computational problems comes in
the place of their classical understanding as true/false statements, with valid formulas
now describing universally correct principles of computability, and the logic in whole
providing a systematic answer to the question on what and how can be algorithmically
solved.
This characterization makes the qualification “logic of problems” adequate for CL.
Hence, in a search for a direct materialization of Kolmogorov’s thesis and (thus) the
constructivistic claims of intuitionistic logic, the semantics of CL should be a reasonable
candidate to try. Indeed, while the ambition of CL is to be a good tool for successfully
navigating the real — non-man-made — world and, accordingly, its semantics has
been created with no intention whatsoever to serve or justify any existing deductive
systems, at the very time of its conception the conjecture was born2 that the set of
theorems of Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus is precisely what one gets by restricting
the otherwise more expressive CL (here identified with the set of its semantically valid
formulas) to a certain natural sublanguage, called in [6] the intuitionistic fragment.
It should be noted that, unlike intuitionistic or linear logics, CL is a semantically
rather than syntactically introduced theory and, at present, many questions on possible
axiomatizations of various fragments of it, including the intuitionistic fragment, being
far from trivial, remain open.
The first step toward a positive verification of the above conjecture has been made
in [11], where the soundness of the full first-order intuitionistic calculus with respect
to the CL semantics was proven. As always, however, finding a completeness proof —
provided that one exists, of course — presents a greater challenge. The right strategy
could be to approach the problem in a patient, step-by-step manner, starting from
some relatively simple yet nontrivial fragment of the logic. The present paper tells a
first success story on the way of following that strategy. It gives a completeness proof
for the implicative fragment of propositional intuitionistic calculus.
We are going to see that there are two operations of computability logic, >– and
◦– , that behave intuitionistically.3 That is, the implicative fragment of intuitionistic
2Officially stated in [6] as Conjecture 25.8.
3The operation ◦– in [6] was denoted by⇒; it was renamed into ◦– later in [9, 10]. In this paper
⇒ has the different meaning of that of a separator of the two parts of a sequent.
2
logic is sound and complete regardless whether its implication is understood as >– or
◦– . The “real” intuitionistic implication, however, is ◦– rather than >– . That is
because the behavior of >– is exactly intuitionistic only in isolation, and stops being so
when >– is taken in combination with other operators: the full intuitionistic calculus
with >– as implication is simply unsound, even though it most likely remains complete.
For example, one could show that the intuitionistically provable formula
(P >–R) >–
(
(Q >–R) >–
(
(P ⊔Q) >–R)
))
,
where ⊔ means disjunction, fails to be a valid principle of computability logic. The offi-
cial conjecture of [6] regarding the soundness and completeness of the full intuitionistic
logic, and the verification of its soundness part in [11], assume reading intuitionistic
implication as ◦– , and reading intuitionistic conjunction, disjunction and quantifiers
as what computability logic calls choice operations ⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔.
Choice operations in CL model decision steps in the course of interaction, with
positive occurrences of disjunction and existential quantifier meaning machine’s choices,
and positive occurrences of conjunction and universal quantifier meaning choices by its
environment (in negative occurrences, the roles are interchanged). For instance, where
f(x) is a function, ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
is the game in which the first move/action/choice
is by the environment, consisting in specifying a particular value m for x. Such a move,
which intuitively can be seen as asking the machine the question “what is the value of
f(m)?” brings the game down to the position ⊔y
(
y = f(m)
)
. The next step is by
the machine, who should specify a value n for y, further bringing the game down to
n = f(m). The latter is understood as a moveless position won by the machine if true
and lost if false.4 The machine’s move n can thus be seen as answering/claiming that
n is the value of f(m). From this explanation it must be clear that ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
represents the problem of computing f , with the machine having an algorithmic winning
strategy for this game iff f is a computable function. Similarly, where S is a set,
⊓x(x ∈ S ⊔ x 6∈ S) represents the problem of deciding S: here, again, the first move is
by the environment, consisting in choosing a value m for x (asking “is m an element
of S?”); and the next step is by the machine who, in order to win, should choose the
true disjunct of m ∈ S ⊔m 6∈ S, i.e. correctly tell whether m is an element of S or not.
As for >– and ◦– , these are two flavors of the operation of reducing one problem to
another. Either one, as a reduction operation, induces — and will be often understood
as — a reducibility relation. Specifically, a problem B is >– -reducible or ◦– -reducible
to a problem A iff the corresponding compound problem A >–B or A ◦–B has an al-
gorithmic solution. Both versions of reducibility are natural and important as both
present conservative extensions of Turing reducibility. That is in the sense that they
are equivalent to Turing reducibility when restricted to the traditional, two-step, in-
put/output sorts of problems. >– and ◦– start to diverge only when their scope is
extended to problems with higher degrees of interactivity — the kind of problems to
which Turing reducibility is inapplicable for the simple reason of never having been
defined or generalized.
4This should not suggest that the atoms of intuitionistic logic are required to be interpreted as
moveless games/positions. Rather, they represent arbitrary interactive computational problems.
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Intuitively, both A >–B and A ◦–B are problems solving which means solving B
while having A as an external computational resource, with an “external computational
resource” meaning a to-be-solved-by-the-environment computational problem. More
precisely, in the antecedent of an implication, the roles of the problem-solving machine
and its environment are interchanged. Acting in the role of an environment there, the
machine may observe how the antecedent is being solved, and utilize this information
in its own solving the consequent.
An example might help. Let T be a finitely axiomatized applied theory based on
classical first-order logic, such as, say, Robinson’s arithmetic, and let x range over the
formulas of the language of T . Next, let PrT (x) be the predicate “x is a theorem of
T ”, Pr(x) the predicate “x is provable in classical predicate calculus”, and ¬PrT (x)
and ¬Pr(x) the ordinary negations of these predicates. As a decision problem, the
T -theoremhood problem would be expressed by ⊓x
(
PrT (x) ⊔ ¬PrT (x)
)
. This is gen-
erally undecidable, yet algorithmically reducible to the problem ⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
of provability in predicate calculus. The problem of reducing the former to the latter
can then be expressed by
⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
⊃ ⊓x
(
PrT (x) ⊔ ¬PrT (x)
)
, (1)
where ⊃ is either one of the operators >– , ◦– . The obligation of a machine solving
the above compound problem is to solve⊓x
(
PrT (x)⊔¬PrT (x)
)
, i.e. answer any given
question of the type “is F a theorem of T?” asked by the environment. Yet, the
machine is expected to do so only on the condition that the environment does not fail
to correctly solve the similar problem ⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
in the antecedent, where
the roles are switched and it is the machine who can ask questions like “is H provable
in predicate calculus?”. So, here is an algorithmic strategy for the machine. Wait
until the environment asks “is F a theorem of T?” for some particular F . Then
ask the counterquestion “is Ax→ F provable in predicate calculus?”, where Ax is the
conjunction of all non-logical axioms of T . The environment will have to provide a
correct yes/no answer, or else it loses. Whatever the answer of the environment in the
antecedent is, repeat the same answer in the consequent, and rest your case. A success
of this strategy is guaranteed by the deduction theorem for classical logic.
Observe that the above explanation of the meaning of A ⊃ B (where ⊃∈ { >– , ◦– })
is exactly what the Turing reduction of B to A is all about. The latter — more precisely,
the Turing reducibility of B to A — is defined as existence of a Turing machine that
solves B when having an oracle correctly answering any questions regarding A. We
can see such an oracle as (a part of) the environment solving A for the machine,
thus providing an external computational resource. The only difference is that the
resource provided by an oracle is always a simple question-answering type of a task
such as the above⊓x
(
Pr(x)⊔¬Pr(x)
)
, while the antecedent (as well as the consequent,
of course) of a >– - or ◦– -implication can have an arbitrarily complex interaction
interface. For instance, (1) is already a problem with a non-standard interface, and
CL, unlike traditional approaches, allows us to meaningfully talk about reducing (1)
itself to yet another problem, or reducing another problem to it.
A relevant question here is whether and how the antecedent, as a resource, is allowed
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to be reused or “recycled”. The answer to the whether part of this question is yes for
both >– and ◦– . Turing reduction does not impose any limits on how many times
the oracle can be queried. Similarly, if our strategy for (1) had a need to repeatedly
ask “is H provable in predicate calculus?” (for various Hs), it would have been able to
do so. This essentially means that multiple copies rather than a single copy of A are
played in the antecedent of A >–B or A ◦–B.
As an aside, computability logic, of course, does have a stronger reduction operation
which forbids repeated usage of the antecedent. The symbol for it is →. In fact, →
is considered the basic sort of reduction: A >–B and A ◦–B are defined through it as
∧
|A → B and ◦
|A → B, with ∧| and ◦
| being two flavors of what CL calls recurrence
(=reusage) operations, both reminiscent of the storage operator ! of linear logic.5 Not
surprisingly, the logical behavior of → turns out to be different from that of >– and
◦– even in isolation: informally speaking, the former is (plainly) resource-sensitive
while the latter are not. The following classical tautology(
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
)
⊃
(
(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
)
is an example of an implicative formula which is valid with both >– and ◦– in the
role of ⊃ but invalid with →. And an example of a tautology invalid with all three
reduction operators ⊃∈ {→, >– , ◦– } is(
(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ P
)
⊃ P
which, known as Pierce’s Law, is the shortest formula separating the implicative frag-
ments of classical and intuitionistic logics.
Back to the resource reusage question, it is its how part where >– and ◦– start to
differ from each other. A ◦–B allows reusage of A in the strongest possible sense, which
makes ◦– the weakest possible form of reduction, putting >– strictly between ◦– and
→. Both A >–B and A ◦–B — more precisely, their ∧|A and ◦|A parts on which we
are currently focused — can be characterized as games where the machine is allowed
to restart the resource game A an unlimited number of times without abandoning the
already-in-progress sessions of A, thus forcing the environment to play/solve multiple
parallel copies of A. The difference is that in A ◦–B, unlike A >–B, the machine
does not have to restart A from the very beginning every time it wants to reuse it;
rather, the machine is (essentially) allowed to backtrack to any of the previous — not
necessarily starting — positions and try a new continuation from there, thus depriving
5As the closest relative of our ◦.
.. (but not ∧.
..) should be named Blass’s [1, 2] semantically introduced
repetition operation R rather than Girard’s syntactically introduced storage operator !. In very ab-
stract, intuitive terms, R could be characterized in a way rather similar to our characterization of
◦.
.. given shortly. This means that the general game philosophy behind ◦..
.
is largely the same as that
behind R. However, when it comes to a materialization of that philosophy — to the technical level,
that is — the similarity between the two operations is lost. The difference is partly related to the
fact that R is only applicable to a limited sort of games called strict in CL, while ◦.
.. is applicable to
everything we would potentially call an interactive computational task. Such a difference is somewhat
reminiscent of the earlier-discussed difference in the degrees of generality between Turing reduction
and our >– , ◦– , even though R, unlike Turing reduction, is on the interactive side, of course. This is
by no means a historical survey paper, and therefore we refer to Sections 13 and 27 of [6] for a further
discussion of how ◦..
.
and R compare. Note that the symbol used in [6] for ◦..
.
was !.
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the adversary of the possibility to reconsider the moves it has already made in that
position. This is in fact the type of reusage every purely software resource allows or
would allow in the presence of an advanced operating system and unlimited memory:
one can start running process A; then fork it at any stage thus creating two threads that
have a common past but possibly diverging futures (with the possibility to treat one of
the threads as a “backup copy” and preserve it for backtracking purposes); then further
fork any of the branches at any time; and so on. The less flexible type of reusage of A
assumed by A >–B, on the other hand, is closer to what infinitely many autonomous
physical resources would naturally offer, such as an unlimited number of independently
acting robots each performing task A, or an unlimited number of computers with
limited memories, each one only capable of and responsible for running a single thread
of process A. Here the effect of replicating/forking an advanced stage of A cannot
be achieved unless, by good luck, there are two identical copies of the stage, meaning
that the corresponding two robots or computers have so far acted in precisely the same
ways.
As already pointed out, however, this difference between A >–B and A ◦–B, while
substantial in the general (truly interactive) case, is too subtle to be relevant when
A is a game that models only a very short and simple potential dialogue between the
interacting parties, consisting in just asking a question and giving an answer. That is,
when A is from the class of problems to which the scopes of the ordinary concepts of
computability, decidability or reducibility have been traditionally limited. And this is
exactly why both of the two — >– and ◦– — versions of reducibility, when restricted
to those special sorts of problems, fully coincide with the kind old textbook concept of
Turing reducibility. As noted, the benefits from the greater degree of resource-reusage
flexibility offered by A ◦–B (as opposed to A >–B) are related to the possibility for
the machine to try different reactions to the same action(s) by the environment in A.
But such potential benefits cannot be realized when A is, say, ⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
.
Because here a given individual session of A immediately ends with an environment’s
move, to which the machine simply has no legal or meaningful responses at all, let
alone having multiple possible responses to experiment with.
Some readers might want to stop at this point and go no farther. That is because
the rest of this paper is only meant for those who are already sufficiently familiar
with computability logic, or are willing to do some parallel reading. CL has been
introduced and reintroduced several times already ([6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]), and it is neither
technically nor ethically feasible any more to do so once again, or even to reproduce
all relevant formal definitions. Such definitions, without accompanying explanations
and illustrations, may not be very helpful in getting a necessary degree of a feel of
the subject, anyway. This article does rely, both technically and motivationally, on
some prior material. Specifically, the proofs presented here should be read after or in
parallel with the relevant parts of [10], which serves as a source of all special notation,
terminology and concepts for the present paper (call it an appendix if you wish). While
long, [10] is easy to read as it is written in a semitutorial style, without assuming any
preliminary knowledge of the subject. Every unfamiliar term or notation used but
not defined in the present paper can and should be looked up in [10], which has a
convenient index of all terms and symbols. Familiarity with or parallel reading of [10]
6
is a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding the rest of this paper.
2 Affine logic
Some of the proofs given in this paper will rely on the fact of the soundness of affine
logic with respect to the CL semantics, established in Section 11 of [10]. Below we
reproduce the relevant — propositional, unit-free, multiplicative-exponential — frag-
ment of affine logic written in the symbols of CL. We follow the notational conventions
of [10], according to which G stands for any (possible empty) finite sequence of formu-
las, ∨|G for any finite sequence of ∨| -prefixed formulas, etc. The nonunderlined letters
D,E, F,G,H,K stand just for formulas. Sequents in this version are one-sided, i.e.
understood as just sequences of formulas rather than pairs of such sequences.
The axioms of (our present fragment of) affine logic are all sequents of the form
¬E,E,
and the rules of inference are given by the following schemata:
G,E, F,H
Exchange
G,F,E,H
G
Weakening
G,E
G, ∨|E, ∨|E
∨
| -Contraction
G, ∨|E
G, ◦|E, ◦|E
◦
| -Contraction
G, ◦|E
G,E1, . . . , En
∨-Introduction
G,E1 ∨ . . . ∨En
G1, E1 . . . Gn, En
∧-Introduction
G1, . . . , Gn, E1 ∧ . . . ∧En
G,E
∨
| -Introduction
G, ∨|E
G,E
◦
| -Introduction
G, ◦|E
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∨
|G,E
∧
| -Introduction
∨
|G, ∧|E
◦
|G,E
◦
| -Introduction
◦
|G, ◦
|E
This formulation does not officially forbid→ in formulas, but it treats E → F as an
abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F , which explains why there are no rules for →. More precisely,
derivability of a formula containing → is to be understood as derivability of the result
of eliminating → from that formula according to the above definition/prescription.
Similarly, E >– F is understood as ¬∧|E ∨ F (i.e. ∧|E → F ) and E ◦– F as ¬◦|E ∨ F
(i.e. ◦
|E → F ). And, when applied to nonatomic formulas, ¬ is understood as an
abbreviation defined by ¬¬E = E, ¬(E1∨. . .∨En) = ¬E1∧. . .∧¬En, ¬(E1∧. . .∧En) =
¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬En, ¬∧
|E = ∨| ¬E, ¬∨|E = ∧|¬E, ¬◦
|E = ◦| ¬E, ¬◦|E = ◦
| ¬E.
Affine logic, in its full (⊥,⊤,⊔,⊓,⊓,⊔-containing) language, was proven to be
sound in [10] in the strong sense that, whenever a formula E is provable in it, E is
not only valid but also uniformly valid, and that, furthermore, there is an effective
procedure that takes an arbitrary proof of an arbitrary formula and constructs a uni-
form solution for that formula. That result, of course, automatically remains true for
our present fragment of affine logic. This fragment is all we need in this paper, and
henceforth we refer to it as affine logic, even though it is only a fragment of the latter
in the proper sense.
The difference between our version of affine logic and Girard’s [4] affine logic is
minor, related to the presence of the two — ∧| , ∨| and ◦
| , ◦| — groups of recurrence
(“exponential”) operators rather than one group. Such a difference is not important
because these groups of exponentials, having exactly the same inference rules, are
deductively indistinguishable (from each other and from Girard’s !, ?).
A known ([4]) result for affine logic straightforwardly applies to our version of it,
according to which the logic is closed under the rule
G,E ¬E,H
Cut
G,H
Understanding E → F , E >– F and E ◦–F as abbreviations of ¬E ∨ F , ¬∧|E ∨ F
and ¬◦
|E∨F (but not forbidding ¬ to be applied to compound formulas), an occurrence
O of a subformula in a given formula, as usual, is said to be negative iff it is in the
scope of an odd number of occurrences of ¬; otherwise it is positive. The following
lemma is true no matter whether →, >– , ◦– are considered primitive symbols or not,
or whether ¬ is allowed to be applied to compound formulas or not.
8
Lemma 2.1 Let G1, G2, H1, H2 be arbitrary formulas of the language of affine logic,
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
• ⊢⊢G1 → G2;
• G1 is a subformula of H1, and H2 is the result of replacing in H1 a certain
occurrence O (fix it) of G1 by G2.
Then we have:
a) If the occurrence O is positive, then ⊢⊢H1 → H2.
b) If the occurrence O is negative, then ⊢⊢H2 → H1.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma (those that go before “Then we
have:”). We also may and will assume that all of the connectives of H1 are among
¬, ◦
| , ∧| and ∧. Indeed, if this is not the case, then H1 can be replaced by H ′1, where H
′
1
is the result of eliminating the unwanted connectives trough rewriting each subformula
E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En as ¬(¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬En), each subformula ◦|E as ¬◦
|¬E, each subformula
E → F as ¬E ∨ F (and then as ¬(E ∧ ¬F )), etc. Based on what we know from [10],
for every interpretation ∗ we would have H∗1 = H
′∗
1 (yes, equality rather than just
equivalence). And the positive/negative status of any (occurrence of a) subformula of
H1 would remain the same in H
′
1. To summarize, H1 and H
′
1 would be “the same” in
every aspect relevant to our lemma, and hence could be safely identified in this proof.
We proceed by induction on the complexity of H1 — more precisely, the complexity
of H1 minus the complexity of G1, for the complexity of the G1 part of H1 is irrelevant.
In this proof we will explicitly or implicitly rely on the fact of the closure of uniform
validity under modus ponens proven in Section 13 of [10], and the already mentioned
fact of the soundness of affine logic with respect to uniform validity.
If H1 = G1, then H2 = G2. Here the occurrence of G1 in H1 (i.e. in itself) is
positive, and we have ⊢⊢H1 → H2 just by our assumption that ⊢⊢G1 → G2.
Next, assume H1 = ¬E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O′
of G1 in E1. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O
′ by G2. Of
course, H2 = ¬E2. Suppose O is positive. Then O′ is negative. By the induction
hypothesis, ⊢⊢E2 → E1. It is an easy syntactic exercise to verify that affine logic proves
(E2 → E1) → (¬E1 → ¬E2), i.e. (E2 → E1) → (H1 → H2). Hence ⊢⊢(E2 → E1) →
(H1 → H2) and, by (the closure of uniform validity under) modus ponens, ⊢⊢H1 → H2.
The case when O is negative will be handled in a symmetric way.
Next, assume H1 = ◦
|E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence
O′ of G1 in E1. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O
′ by G2.
We thus have H2 = ◦
|E2. Suppose O is positive. Then so is O
′. By the induction
hypothesis, ⊢⊢E1 → E2. Then, according the ◦
| -closure lemma proven in Section 13 of
[10], ⊢⊢◦
| (E1 → E2). One can routinely verify that affine logic derives ◦
| (E1 → E2) →
(◦
|E1 → ◦
|E2), i.e. ◦
| (E2 → E1) → (H1 → H2). Hence ⊢⊢◦
| (E2 → E1) → (H1 → H2)
and, by modus ponens, ⊢⊢H1 → H2. The case when O is negative will be handled in a
symmetric way.
The case H1 = ∧
|E1 is similar to the previous one, with the only difference that it
relies on the ∧| -closure lemma rather than the ◦
| -closure lemma of Section 13 of [10].
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Finally, assume that (H1 6= G1 and) the main operator of H1 is ∧. As an example,
here we only consider the case H1 = E1∧F , where the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the
occurrence O′ of G1 in E1. All other cases will be similar. So, we have H2 = E2 ∧ F ,
where E2 is the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O
′ by G2. Suppose O is
positive. Then so is O′. By the induction hypothesis, ⊢⊢E1→ E2. One can also verify
that affine logic proves (E1→E2) → (E1 ∧ F→E2 ∧ F ), i.e. (E1→E2) → (H1→H2).
Hence ⊢⊢(E1→E2)→ (H1→ H2) and, by modus ponens, ⊢⊢H1→H2. The case when O
is negative will be handled in a symmetric way. ✷
3 Intuitionistic logic
3.1 Syntax
The implicative fragment of intuitionistic logic comes to us in two versions: Int◦- ,
which reads intuitionistic implication as ◦– , and Int>- , which reads it as >– . Its
language has infinitely many propositional (i.e. 0-ary) letters (=atoms), for which we
use the metavariables P , Q, R, X , Y , Z, W , possibly with indices. It should be noted
that, when it comes to interpretations, these are general rather than elementary letters
(see [10], Section 7), just as the letters of affine logic are. The formulas of the language
of Int◦-, to which we refer as Int◦--formulas, are built from atoms in the standard
way using the binary operator ◦– . There are no other operators in the language, nor
are there any logical atoms such as ⊤ or ⊥. Similarly for the language of Int
>-, with
Int
>--formulas using >– instead of ◦– . The languages of Int◦- and Int>- are thus
sublanguages of the language of affine logic.
Next, an Int◦--sequent is a pair G ⇒ E, where G, called the antecedent, is
any finite sequence of Int◦--formulas, and E, called the succedent, is a (one single)
Int◦--formula. Int>--sequents are defined similarly. Unlike our choice of one-sided
sequents for affine logic, here we thus deal with two-sided sequents.
Below is a Gentzen-style deductive system for Int◦-. A formula K is considered
provable in it iff the empty-antecedent sequent ⇒ K is provable.
The axioms of Int◦- are all Int◦--sequents of the form K ⇒ K, and the rules of
inference are:
G,E, F,H ⇒ K
Exchange
G,F,E,H ⇒ K
G⇒ K
Weakening
G,E ⇒ K
G,F, F ⇒ K
Contraction
G,F ⇒ K
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G,F ⇒ K
Right ◦–
G⇒ F ◦–K
G,F ⇒ K1 H ⇒ K2
Left ◦–
G,H,K2 ◦–F ⇒ K1
The system Int
>- is defined in the same way as Int◦-, only with >– instead of ◦– ,
of course.
3.2 Kripke semantics
A Kripke model [13] is a triple M = (W ,R, |≡ ), where:
• W is a (here) finite set of what are called worlds (of M).
• R is a transitive and reflexive relation between worlds. When pRq, we say that
world q is accessible (in M) from world p.
• |≡ is a relation between worlds and Int◦--formulas, satisfying the following two
conditions for all formulas E,F and worlds p, q:
– if p |≡E and pRq, then q |≡E;
– p |≡E ◦– F iff, whenevr pRq and q |≡E, we have q |≡ F .
When G is a sequence or a set of formulas, we write p |≡G to mean that p |≡G for
every formula G of G. The relation |≡ further extends to sequents by stipulating
that p |≡G⇒ E iff, for every world q accessible from p, if q |≡G, then q |≡E. The
symbol /|≡ , as expected, will be used for the negation of |≡ .
LetM = (W ,R, |≡ ) be a Kripke model. Where F is a Int◦--formula, or a sequence
of Int◦--formulas, or a set of Int◦--formulas, or a Int◦--sequent, we write M|≡F to
mean that p |≡ F for every p ∈ W . And we say that an Int◦--formula E is M-
equivalent to an Int◦--formula F — symbolically M|≡E ◦–◦ F — iff M|≡E ◦– F
and M|≡ F ◦–E. Obviously M|≡E ◦–◦ F means that, for each world p of M, p |≡E
iff p |≡ F , so that “M does not see any difference between E and F”. Note also that
wheneverM|≡E ◦–◦E′ andM|≡ F ◦–◦ F ′, we also haveM|≡ (E ◦–F ) ◦–◦ (E′ ◦–F ′).
We read ξ |≡ ς (whatever ξ and ς are) as “ς is true in ξ”, and ξ /|≡ ς as “ς is false in
ξ”.
It is an established ([13]) fact that Int◦- is sound and complete with respect to
Kripke semantics, in the sense that an Int◦--sequent or formula S is provable in Int◦-
if (completeness) and only if (soundness) S is true in every Kripke model. For
known and straightforward reasons, Kripke models here can be restricted to ones where
(W ,R) forms a tree rather than just a partial order, and the above fact then can be
rephrased by saying that a sequent or formula is provable in Int◦- iff it is true in the
root world of every tree-like Kripke model.
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3.3 Main theorem
By a Σ1-predicate we mean a predicate that can be written as ∃zA for some de-
cidable finitary predicate (elementary game) A. And a Boolean combination of
Σ1-predicates is a ¬,∧,∨-combination of such games.
Note that, since we deal with a propositional language, every interpretation is
admissible for every formula. So, when considering interpretations, there is no need to
bother about or even mention their admissibility.
Below is our main theorem, according to which the implicative fragment of intu-
itionistic logic is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of computability
logic, no matter whether the intuitionistic implication is read as >– or ◦– . Both the
soundness and the completeness clauses come in certain strong forms.
Theorem 3.1 For any Int◦-- (resp. Int>--) formula K, K is provable in Int◦- (resp.
Int
>- ) iff K is valid iff K is uniformly valid. Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary Int◦-- (resp. Int>--)
proof of an arbitrary formula K and constructs a uniform solution for K.
(b) If an Int◦-- (resp. Int>--) formula K is not provable in Int◦- (resp. Int>-),
then K∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ satisfying the following complex-
ity condition: ∗ interprets every atom (of the languages of Int◦-, Int>-) as a problem
of the form ⊔xB, where B is a Boolean combination of Σ1-predicates.
Proof. As already mentioned and relied upon, affine logic is sound in the strong
sense of clause (a) of this theorem ([10], Section 11). So, to prove the soundness of
Int◦-, Int>- and the corresponding clause (a), it would be sufficient to show that affine
logic derives any formula K that Int◦- or Int>- does, and that, furthermore, that an
affine-logic proof of K can be effectively constructed from an Int◦- - or Int>- -proof of
it. This purely syntactic and easy-to-verify (by induction on the lengths of proofs) fact
can be considered already known in the form of Girard’s [4] embedding of intuitionistic
calculus into linear (and hence also affine) logic. Indeed, unlike intuitionistic disjunction
for which Girard’s reading is essentially different from ours,6 intuitionistic implication
from F to G in [4] is understood as !F → G, just like we read it as ◦
| F → G or ∧|F → G.
Of course, the soundness of Int◦- also immediately follows from the soundness of the
full intuitionistic calculus proven in [11].
As for the completeness part of Theorem 3.1 and the corresponding clause (b), this
is exactly to what the rest of the present paper is devoted. ✷
4 Machines playing against machines
This section borrows a discussion from [7], providing certain background information
necessary for our completeness proof but missing in [10], the only external source on
6Girard’s translation for the intuitionistic disjunction of F and G is !F⊕!G, while our reading is
(simply) F ⊔G. This explains why one could not apply a similar soundness argument to Int>- in the
full (disjunction-containing) language, which, as mentioned in Section 1, can indeed be shown to be
unsound.
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computability logic on which the present paper was promised to rely.
Remember that ¬Γ, when Γ is a run, means the result of reversing all labels in Γ.
For a run Γ and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells
Γ iff B spells ¬Γ in the sense of Section 6 of [10]. Intuitively, when a machineM plays
as ⊥ (rather than ⊤), then the run that is generated by a given computation branch
B of M is the run cospelled (rather than spelled) by B, for the moves that M makes
get the label ⊥, and the moves that its adversary makes get the label ⊤.
We say that an EPM E is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch
of E is fair in the sense of Section 6 of [10].
Lemma 4.1 Assume E is a fair EPM, H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There
are a uniquely defined e-computation branch BE of E and a uniquely defined e-computation
branch BH of H — which we respectively call the (E , e,H)-branch and the (H, e, E)-
branch — such that the run spelled by BH, called the H vs. E run on e, is the run
cospelled by BE .
When H, E , e are as above, Γ is the H vs. E run on e and A is a game with
WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤ (resp. Wn
A
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊥), we say that H wins (resp. loses) A against E
on e.
A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [6] (Lemma 20.4), and we will
not reproduce the formal proof here. Instead, the following intuitive explanation would
suffice:
Proof idea. Assume H, E , e are as in Lemma 4.1. The play that we are going to
describe is the unique play generated when the two machines play against each other,
with H in the role of ⊤, E in the role of ⊥, and e spelled on the valuation tapes of both
machines. We can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the process
H remains inactive (sleeping); it is woken up only when E enters a permission state,
on which event H makes a (one single) transition to its next computation step — that
may or may not result in making a move — and goes back to sleep that will continue
until E enters a permission state again, and so on. From E ’s perspective, H acts as a
patient adversary who makes one or zero move only when granted permission, just as
the EPM-model assumes. And from H’s perspective, who, like a person in a comma,
has no sense of time during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events
that it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant rate, E acts as an
adversary who can make any finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. while H
was sleeping), just as the HPM-model assumes. This scenario uniquely determines an
e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E , e,H)-branch, and an e-computation
branch BH of H that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we call the H vs. E run on
e is the run generated in this play. In particular — since we let H play in the role of
⊤ — this is the run spelled by BH. E , who plays in the role of ⊥, sees the same run,
only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in negative colors. That is, BE cospells
rather than spells that run. This is exactly what Lemma 4.1 asserts. ✸
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5 Standardization
Let us agree that, throughout this section, “formula” means Int◦--formula, “sequent”
means Int◦--sequent, and “provable” (⊢) means provable in Int◦-.
We say that a sequent is standard iff it is
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1), · · · , Xs ◦– (Ys ◦–Zs),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, · · · , (Ps ◦–Qs) ◦–Rs
}
⇒ W,
where s ≥ 0 and the Xi, Yi, Zi, Pi, Qi, Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ s) and W are atoms.
Where K is a formula and H is a subformula of it, throughout this section we
will be using the notation HK for a certain atom which, intuitively, is a “standard
atomic name” assigned by us to H . Specifically, let G1, . . . , Gs be all of the non-atomic
subformulas of K listed according to the lexicographic order, and let W1, . . . ,Ws be
the first (in the lexicographic order) s atoms of the language of Int◦- not occurring in
K. Then we define the atom HK by stipulating that:
• HK = H if H is atomic;
• HK =Wi if H = Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ s).
Let K be a formula, and
G1 = E1 ◦–F1, . . . , Gs = Es ◦–Fs
all of its non-atomic subformulas, listed according to the lexicographic order. We define
the standardization of K as the following sequent:
GK1 ◦– (EK1 ◦–FK1 ), · · · , GKs ◦– (EKs ◦– FKs ),
(EK1 ◦–FK1 ) ◦–GK1 , · · · , (EKs ◦– FKs ) ◦–GKs
}
⇒ KK .
Notice that the standardization of K is (indeed) a standard sequent.
Example: Where W1,W2,W3 are lexicographically the first three atoms different
from Q and R, the following sequent is the standardization of Q ◦–
(
(Q ◦–R) ◦–R
)
:
W1 ◦– (Q ◦–R), W2 ◦– (W1 ◦–R), W3 ◦– (Q ◦–W2),
(Q ◦–R) ◦–W1, (W1 ◦–R) ◦–W2, (Q ◦–W2) ◦–W3
}
⇒ W3.
Lemma 5.1 Let K be an arbitrary formula, G ⇒ W its standardization, and M =
(W ,R, |≡ ) a Kripke model with M|≡G. Then every subformula H of K is M-
equivalent to HK . Consequently, M|≡K ◦–◦W .
Proof. Let K, G ⇒ W , M, H be as the lemma assumes. We proceed by
induction on the complexity of H . The case when H is atomic is trivial, because
then HK = H . Suppose now H = E ◦–F . Then G contains HK ◦– (EK ◦– FK) and
(EK ◦–FK) ◦–HK . Therefore, as M|≡G, we have
M|≡ (EK ◦–FK) ◦–◦HK .
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But, by the induction hypothesis, M|≡EK ◦–◦E and M|≡ FK ◦–◦ F . Hence
M|≡ (EK ◦– FK) ◦–◦ (E ◦–F ).
Consequently, M|≡ (E ◦–F ) ◦–◦HK , i.e. M|≡H ◦–◦HK . ✷
Lemma 5.2 If 7 a formula is not provable, then its standardization is not provable,
either.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary formula K and its standardization G⇒W . Assume
6⊢ K. Then, by the completeness of Int◦- with respect to Kripke semantics, there is a
model M = (W ,R, |≡ ) with M /|≡K. We may assume here that, for every subformula
H of K, M|≡H ◦–◦HK . Indeed, when H is atomic, then it is automatically M-
equivalent to HK because H = HK . And if H is not atomic, then HK is not among
the atoms of K, and we may make arbitrary assumptions regarding in what worlds the
atom HK is true without affecting the fact that M /|≡K; so, our assumption is that
HK is true exactly in the the worlds where H is true.
We claim that M|≡G. Indeed, pick an arbitrary formula H of G. We need to
show that M|≡H . There are two cases to consider, depending on the form of H .
One possibility is that H = GK ◦– (EK ◦–FK). By the above assumptions regard-
ing M, we have M|≡GK ◦–◦G, M|≡EK ◦–◦E and M|≡ FK ◦–◦ F . So, in order to
verify that M|≡H , it would suffice to show that M|≡G ◦– (E ◦– F ). But this is
trivially so because — note — G is nothing but E ◦–F . The other possibility is
H = (EK ◦–FK) ◦–GK , which is similar.
Now, as M /|≡K, we have M /|≡W because, by Lemma 5.1, M|≡W ◦–◦K. This,
together withM|≡G, means thatM /|≡G⇒W . Therefore, by the soundness of Int◦-
with respect to Kripke semantics, 6⊢ G⇒W , as desired. ✷
Lemma 5.3 Let K be an arbitrary formula, and G ⇒ W its standardization. Then
⊢ K,G⇒ W .
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that G ⇒ W is the standardization of a
formula K, and 6⊢ K,G ⇒ W . Then, by the completeness of Int◦- with respect to
Kripke semantics, there is a Kripke model M = (W ,R, |≡ ) with M /|≡K,G ⇒ W ,
meaning that, for some world p ∈ W , we have p |≡K, p |≡G and p /|≡W . Obviously
here we may assume that every world is accessible from p, so that M|≡G. Then, by
Lemma 5.1, M|≡K ◦–◦W . But this is a contradiction, because p |≡K and p /|≡W . ✷
6 Desequentization
In this section, we will write Int◦- ⊢ for provability in Int◦- and AL⊢ for provability
in affine logic.
7In fact, this lemma can be shown to be true in the stronger “if and only if” form, but for our
purposes this is not necessary.
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Let S be the (arbitrary) standard sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1), · · · , Xs ◦– (Ys ◦–Zs),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, · · · , (Ps ◦–Qs) ◦–Rs
}
⇒ W.
Then we define the desequentization of S as the following formula of the language
of affine logic:
◦
|
(
X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
Xs ∧ Ys → Zs
)
∧
◦
|
(
(◦
|P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
(◦
| Ps → Qs)→ Rs
) → W.
As an aside, the desequentization of S should not be understood as expressing
the “intended meaning” (say, as defined in [11]) of S. A formula expressing the in-
tended meaning of S can be obtained from the above one by inserting a ◦
| before every
subformula Xi, Yi and (◦
| Pi → Qi). S and its desequentization are not semantically
equivalent: the latter, with its missing occurrences of ◦
| , is weaker than the former.
Lemma 6.1 Assume K is an Int◦--formula, and D is the desequentization of the
standardization of K. Then, for any interpretation ∗ with |= K∗, we have |= D∗.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Int◦--formula K and an arbitrary interpretation ∗
with |= K∗. Let
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1), · · · , Xs ◦– (Ys ◦–Zs),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, · · · , (Ps ◦–Qs) ◦–Rs
}
⇒ W (2)
be the standardization of K. Using G1, . . . , G2s as abbreviations of the 2s formulas of
the antecedent of the above sequent, we rewrite it as
G1, . . . , G2s ⇒W.
According to Lemma 5.3,
Int◦- ⊢ K,G1, . . . , G2s ⇒W.
From here, applying the Right ◦– rule 2s+ 1 times, we get
Int◦- ⊢ K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2s ◦–W ) . . .)).
As noted in our proof of the soundness part of Theorem 3.1, affine logic proves every
formula provable in Int◦-. So, the above Int◦--provability translates into
AL ⊢ K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2s ◦–W ) . . .)). (3)
Next, in a routine syntactic exercise, one can show that
AL ⊢ ¬(K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2s ◦–W ) . . .))), ◦|K → (◦|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦|G2s →W ).
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The above, together with (3), by the closure of affine logic under cut, implies
AL ⊢ ◦
|K → (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2s →W ),
whence, by the soundness of affine logic,
|= ◦
|K∗ → (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2s →W )
∗. (4)
According to the theorem of Section 10 of [10], the rule of modus ponens preserves
computability. And, according to one of the lemmas of Section 13 of [10], so does
the rule “from A to ◦
|A”. So, our assumption |= K∗ implies |= ◦
|K∗, and the latter,
together with (4), by the closure of computability under modus ponens, implies
|= (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2s →W )
∗.
If we now disabbreviate the Gis, the formula ◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2s →W rewrites as
◦
|
(
◦
|X1 → (◦
| Y1 → Z1)
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
◦
|Xs → (◦
| Ys → Zs)
)
∧
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
|P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| Ps → Qs)→ Rs
) → W, (5)
so we have |= (5)∗. Next, consider the formula
◦
| (◦
|X1 ∧ ◦
| Y1 → Z1) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦
| (◦
|Xs ∧ ◦
| Ys → Zs) ∧
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
|P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| Ps → Qs)→ Rs
) → W. (6)
One can easily verify that affine logic proves (5) → (6) and hence, by the soundness
of affine logic, |= (5)∗ → (6)∗. From here and |= (5)∗, by the fact that modus ponens
preserves computability, we infer
|= (6)∗.
Next, for any formula E, of course, AL ⊢ ◦
|E → E. Hence, by the soundness of
affine logic,
⊢⊢◦
|E → E (any E). (7)
Now, consider the desequentization D of (2), which is
◦
| (X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦
| (Xs ∧ Ys → Zs) ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
(◦
|Ps ◦–Qs)→ Rs
) → W.
Observe that D is nothing but the result of deleting ◦
| before every subformula Xi,
Yi and (◦
| Pi → Qi) in (6). And (the occurrences of) all such subformulas are positive.
So, with (7) in mind, we can rely — 3s times — on Lemma 2.1 in combination with
the Transitivity lemma of Section 13 of [10], and conclude that ⊢⊢(6)→ D 8 and hence
|= (6)∗ → D∗. This, together with the earlier established fact |= (6)∗, by the closure
of computability under modus ponens, implies the desired |= D∗. ✷
8Of course, we could have shown the same by verifying that (the sound) affine logic proves (6)→ D.
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7 Main lemma
Lemma 7.1 If a standard Int◦--sequent is not provable in Int◦-, then its desequenti-
zation D is not valid; specifically, there is an interpretation ∗ satisfying the complexity
condition of clause (b) of Theorem 3.1 such that D∗ is not computable.
The present section is entirely devoted to a proof of this lemma. But before we start
our long journey through that proof, let us see that this lemma implies the completeness
of Int◦-, in the strong form of clause (b) of Theorem 3.1.
Indeed, suppose K is an Int◦--formula not provable in Int◦-. Let S be the stan-
dardization of K. By Lemma 5.2, Int◦- does not prove S. Then, by our main lemma
7.1, D∗ is not computable, where D is the desequentization of S and ∗ is an interpre-
tation satisfying the complexity condition of clause (b) of Theorem 3.1. But then, by
Lemma 6.1, for the same interpretation ∗, K∗ is not computable. Done!
Thus, as far as the Int◦- part of our main Theorem 3.1 is concerned, our only
remaining duty is to prove Lemma 7.1. The Int
>- part of Theorem 3.1 will be taken
care of in Section 8.
7.1 Main claim
Let us get started with our proof of Lemma 7.1. We pick and fix an arbitrary standard
Int◦--sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1), · · · , Xs ◦– (Ys ◦–Zs),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, · · · , (Ps ◦–Qs) ◦–Rs
}
⇒ W, (8)
and assume that Int◦- 6⊢ (8).
Let us agree for the rest of this section that
j and i exclusively range over 1, . . . , s and 1, . . . , 2s, respectively.
The desequentization of (8) is
◦
| (X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦
| (Xs ∧ Ys → Zs) ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
(◦
|Ps → Qs)→ Rs
) → W. (9)
Thus, our goal is to find a counterinterpretation (satisfying the complexity condition
of Theorem 3.1) for the formula (9), with a counterinterpretation here meaning an
interpretation ∗ such that 6|= (9)∗.
Once again remember, from Section 7 of [10], the distinction between general and
elementary letters. Elementary letters are to be interpreted as predicates (elemen-
tary games), while general letters can be interpreted as arbitrary static games. As
noted before, the letters (atoms) of both affine logic and intuitionistic logic are general
rather than elementary. However, when it comes to interpretations, formulas with only
elementary letters — called elementary-base formulas — are both technically and intu-
itively easier to deal with than those with general letters. For this reason, we are going
18
to replace (9) with the elementary-base — though no longer propositional — formula
(10) of the same form as (9), and then construct a counterinterpretation for (10) rather
than (9).
In particular, for each atom A of the language of Int◦-, we fix a unique 1-ary
elementary letter A˙ — unique in the sense that whenever A 6= B, we also have A˙ 6= B˙.
We also fix a variable x and, for each atom A of the language of Int◦-, agree on the
abbreviation A˘ defined by
A˘ = ⊔xA˙(x).
Now, the above-mentioned elementary-base formula (10) is simply obtained from (9)
through replacing every atom A by A˘:
◦
| (X˘1 ∧ Y˘1 → Z˘1) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦
| (X˘s ∧ Y˘s → Z˘s) ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘1 → Q˘1)→ R˘1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘s → Q˘s)→ R˘s
) → W˘ . (10)
We label the following statement (and subsequent similar statements) “claim”
rather than “lemma” because it is true only in our particular context, set by the
assumption that (8) is not provable in Int◦-.
Claim 7.2 There is an interpretation ⋆ with 6|= (10)⋆, satisfying the complexity
condition that ⋆ interprets every elementary atom as a Boolean combination of Σ1-
predicates.
Before we attempt to prove Claim 7.2, let us see that it implies the main Lemma 7.1.
Remember that our assumption, within the proof of Lemma 7.1, is that Int◦- 6⊢ (8).
According to Claim 7.2 which is based on that assumption, we have 6|= (10)⋆, where ⋆
is a certain interpretation sending every elementary atom to a Boolean combination of
Σ1-predicates. Let now
∗ be the interpretation that sends every atom A of the language
of Int◦- to A˘⋆. Obviously then (9)∗ = (10)⋆, so that 6|= (9)∗. And clearly ∗ does satisfy
the complexity condition of clause (b) of Theorem 3.1. As (9) is the desequentization
of (8), we find Lemma 7.1 proven.
So, the “only” remaining duty within our proof of the main Lemma 7.1 is to prove
Claim 7.2. The rest of this section is solely devoted to that task.
7.2 Terminology and notation
Note that, since each atom of (10) is to be interpreted as an elementary game, the
structure (Lr component) of the game (10)
⋆
does not depend on the selection of an
interpretation ⋆. This nice property of elementary-base formulas was one of our rea-
sons for choosing to deal with (10) instead of (9). In many contexts, it allows us to
terminologically treat (10) as if it was a game, even though, strictly speaking, it is just
a formula, and becomes a game only after an interpretation is applied to it. Namely,
we can and will unambiguously say “legal run of (10)”, meaning “legal run of (10)⋆ for
some (= every) interpretation ⋆”.
We will often need to differentiate between subformulas of (9) or (10) and partic-
ular occurrences of such. It should be remembered that the expressions “Pj”, “P˘j”,
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“X˘j ∧ Y˘j”, etc. are metaexpressions, denoting subformulas of (9) or (10). As it hap-
pens, for different occurrences of subformulas of (9) or (10) we have chosen different
metaexpressions, so those occurrences can be safely identified with the corresponding
metaexpressions. To avoid possible notational confusions, we will write “⌊Pj⌋”, “⌊P˘j⌋”,
“⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋”, etc. to indicate that we mean metaexpressions (= particular occur-
rences of subformulas) rather than the formulas for which those expressions stand. So,
say, when we write X˘i = X˘j or X˘i = Q˘j , we mean that X˘i and X˘j , or X˘i and Q˘j , are
identical as formulas; on the other hand, by writing ⌊X˘i⌋ = ⌊X˘j⌋ we will mean that
the two metaexpressions “X˘i” and “X˘j” are graphically identical, i.e., that X˘i and
X˘j stand for the same occurrence of the same subformula of (10), which implies that
i = j. And, as the expressions “X˘” and “Q˘” are graphically different from each other,
we would never have ⌊X˘i⌋ = ⌊Q˘j⌋, no matter what i and j are.
Consider any particular legal position or run Γ of (10). Since (10) is the →-
combination of games, every move of Γ has the form 1.α or 2.α. Intuitively, 1.α
means the move α made in the antecedent of (10), and 2.α the move α made in the
consequent. Correspondingly, we think of Γ as consisting of two subruns which, using
the notational conventions of Subsection 4.3 of [10], are denoted by Γ1. and Γ2.. We
will be referring to Γ2. as the Γ-residual position of ⌊W˘⌋, because, intuitively, Γ2. is
what remains of Γ after discarding in it everything but the part that constitutes a run
in the ⌊W˘ ⌋ component of (10). Note that we wrote ⌊W˘ ⌋ here. Using just W˘ instead
could have been ambiguous, for W˘ , as a formula, may (and probably does) have many
occurrences in (10), while ⌊W˘ ⌋ refers to the occurrence of that formula in the conse-
quent and only there. Also, we said “position” rather than “run”. It is safe to do so
because Γ2., which has to be a legal run of the game W˘ = ⊔xW˙ (x) (for otherwise Γ
would not be a legal run of (10)), contains at most one labmove — namely, it is 〈〉 or
〈⊤a〉 for some constant a.
As for Γ1., it is a legal run of the negation of the antecedent of (10) rather than the
antecedent itself. That is so because, as we remember, a game A → B is defined as
¬A∨B. And this means nothing but that ¬Γ1. is a legal run of the antecedent of (10).
So, we will be interested in ¬Γ1. rather than Γ1., because we prefer to see the antecedent
of (10) as it is, without a negation. The antecedent of (10), in turn, is a ∧-conjunction,
and we think of ¬Γ1. as consisting of as many subruns as the number of conjuncts.
Namely, each such subrun is ¬Γ1.i. for some i. If here i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, we call ¬Γ1.i. the
Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| (X˘i ∧ Y˘i → Z˘i)⌋, and if i = s+ j, we call ¬Γ1.i. the Γ-residual
run of ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j
)
⌋. As in the case of ⌊W˘⌋, such names correspond to the
intuitive meanings of ¬Γ1.i.. For example, where 1 ≤ j ≤ s, ¬Γ1.j. can be characterized
as the part of Γ that constitutes a run in the ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ component. Such a
run should be a legal run of the game (represented by) ◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j), for otherwise
Γ would not be a legal run of (10).
Assume Ψ is the Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋. We will be referring to
the bitstring tree Tree◦
..
.
(X˘j∧Y˘j→Z˘j)〈Ψ〉 (see Subsection 4.6 of [10]) as the Γ-residual
⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree. Intuitively, this is the underlying BT structure of the subrun
of Γ that is taking place in the ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ component of (10). Then the
run Ψ is further thought of as consisting of multiple legal runs of X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ,
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specifically, the run Ψw (again, see Subsection 4.6 of [10]) for each complete branch
w of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree. Notice that such a Ψw, as a legal run
of X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j , would be finite, containing at most 3 labmoves. Hence we can refer
to it as “position” rather than “run”. We call such a position Ψw the Γ-residual
position of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⌋w. The Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree and
the Γ-residual run of ⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j⌋w (where w is a complete branch of that
tree) are defined similarly. In this case, for safety, we say run rather than position,
for the game (represented by) (◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j is not finite-depth because of its
◦
| P˘j-component, and hence the corresponding Ψ
w may be infinite.
Assume w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree, and Θ is
the Γ-residual position of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⌋w. Such a Θ is thought of as consisting of two
subpositions: ¬Θ1. and Θ2.. We respectively refer to these as the Γ-residual position
of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w and the Γ-residual position of ⌊Z˘j⌋w. In turn, ¬Θ1. is further seen
as consisting of two subpositions ¬Θ1.1. and ¬Θ1.2., to which we respectively refer as
the Γ-residual position of ⌊X˘j⌋
w and the Γ-residual position of ⌊Y˘j⌋
w. Similarly,
if w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree and Θ is
the Γ-residual run of ⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j⌋w, we respectively refer to ¬Θ1.,Θ2.,Θ1.1.
and ¬Θ1.2. as the Γ-residual runs of ⌊◦
| P˘j → Q˘j⌋w, ⌊R˘j⌋w, ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w and ⌊Q˘j⌋w,
respectively (in the cases of ⌊R˘j⌋w and ⌊Q˘j⌋w we can always say “position” instead of
“run”, of course).
Assume w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree, and
Υ is the Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋
w. We call Tree◦
... P˘j 〈Υ〉 the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋
w-tree.
Υ is then further seen as consisting of multiple legal positions of P˘j , specifically, the
position Υu for each complete branch u of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree. We refer to
such a position Υu as the Γ-residual position of ⌊P˘j⌋
w
u .
In the above terminological conventions we have started writing “⌊X˘i ∧ Y˘i⌋w”,
“⌊P˘i⌋wu ”, etc. Formally these, just like simply “⌊X˘i ∧ Y˘i⌋” or “⌊P˘i⌋”, are metaex-
pressions. If, say, we write ⌊X˘i⌋
w = ⌊X˘j⌋
u, we imply that the two components are
graphically the same, here meaning that i = j and w = u. Note that such metaexpres-
sions would not always be finite. For instance, ⌊X˘i⌋w would be infinite if the bitstring
w is so; this, however, can only be the case when Γ is an infinite run.
What we call the residual molecules of Γ, or simply Γ-molecules, are the fol-
lowing metaexpressions:
• ⌊W˘ ⌋;
• ⌊X˘j⌋w, ⌊Y˘j⌋w and ⌊Z˘j⌋w for each j and each complete branch w of the Γ-residual
⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree.
• ⌊Q˘j⌋
w and ⌊R˘j⌋
w for each j and each complete branch w of the Γ-residual
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree.
• ⌊P˘j⌋wu for each j, each complete branch w of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) →
R˘j
)
⌋-tree and each complete branch u of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree.
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We may say just “molecule” instead of “Γ-molecule” when Γ is fixed in a given
context or is irrelevant.
We say that the types of the above 7 sorts of molecules are W , Xj , Yj , Zj , Qj ,
Rj and Pj , respectively. When irrelevant, the subscript j can be omitted here. We
differentiate between types and what we call metatypes. The metatype of ⌊W˘ ⌋ is the
metaexpression ⌊W ⌋; the metatype of ⌊P˘j⌋wu is the metaexpression ⌊Pj⌋; the metatype
of ⌊X˘j⌋w is the metaexpression ⌊Xj⌋, and similarly for ⌊Y˘j⌋w, ⌊Z˘j⌋w ⌊Q˘j⌋w, ⌊R˘j⌋w.
As in the case of types, the subscripts j can be omitted here when irrelevant. Notice
that if two molecules have different types, then they also have different metatypes, but
not vice versa: for instance, ⌊Q˘j⌋w and ⌊R˘j⌋v would always have different metatypes
(because “Q” 6=“R”), but their types may be identical, meaning that so are the atoms
of (9) for the occurrences of which Qj and Rj stand.
⌊W ⌋-, ⌊X⌋-, ⌊Y ⌋- and ⌊Q⌋-metatype molecules are said to be positive; and ⌊Z⌋-,
⌊R⌋- and ⌊P ⌋-metatype molecules are said to be negative. When one of two molecules
M1,M2 is positive and the other is negative, we say that M1 and M2 have opposite
genders. Mark the fact that, for a Γ-residual molecule M , the Γ-residual position of
M is always 〈〉 or 〈⊤a〉 for some constant a. Note that here, if M is negative, the move
a is made by player ⊥ even though it is ⊤-labeled in 〈⊤a〉.
Let M be a Γ-molecule of type A ∈ {W,Xj, Yj , Zj, Qj , Rj , Pj | 1 ≤ j ≤ s}. We say
that M , as a Γ-molecule (or in Γ), is:
• virgin iff the Γ-residual position ofM is empty; in this case we define the content
of M to be the formula A˘, i.e. ⊔xA˙(x);
• devirginized iff the Γ-residual position of M is 〈⊤a〉; in this case we define the
content of M to be the formula A˙(a).
Note that two molecules may have identical contents even if their metatypes (but
not types!) are different.
Intuitively, the content of a given Γ-molecule M is the game to which the corre-
sponding subgame of (10) has evolved as a result of the moves of Γ made within the
M component. Here the corresponding (sub)game is what we see in the expression M
between “⌊” and “⌋”. For instance, the game corresponding to ⌊W˘ ⌋ is W˘ , the game
corresponding to ⌊X˘j⌋w is X˘j , and the game corresponding to ⌊P˘j⌋wu is P˘j . For ⌊W˘ ⌋
(and similarly for other molecules), virginity thus means that the moves of Γ have not
affected this component (that is, none of those moves were made within ⌊W˘ ⌋), so that,
as a (sub)game, it remains ⊔xW˙ (x); and being devirginized means that the moves of
Γ have brought the game ⊔xW˙ (x) down to W˙ (a) for some constant a.
We say that a Γ-molecule M1 is matchingly devirginized (in Γ) iff M1 is devir-
ginized and there is another devirginized Γ-molecule M2 such that M1 and M2 have
opposite genders but identical contents. If M1 is devirginized but not matchingly so,
then we say that it is non-matchingly devirginized.
Note that, for a Γ-residual molecule M , the content of M , as well as whether M
virgin, devirginized or matchingly devirginized, depends on Γ. That is why, unless Γ
is fixed or clear from the context, for safety we should say “the content of M in Γ”
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instead of just “the content ofM”, say “M is devirginized in Γ” or “M , as a Γ-molecule,
is devirginized” instead of just “M is devirginized”, etc. The point is that the same
metaexpression M can be a residual molecule of two different runs. Relevant to our
interests are only the cases when one run, say Γ1, is an initial segment of the other run,
say Γ2. Assume this is so for the rest of the present paragraph, and assume M is a
Γ1-molecule. If M = ⌊W˘ ⌋, M will also be a Γ2-molecule. It is possible, however, that
M is virgin in Γ1 while devirginized in Γ2; and if so, the content of M in Γ1 will be
different from that in Γ2. And it is also generally possible that M is non-matchingly
devirginized in Γ1 while matchingly devirginized in Γ2. Similarly when the metatype
of M is anything other than ⌊W ⌋. However, when M is a non-⌊W ⌋-metatype Γ1-
molecule such as, say, ⌊X˘j⌋w, then there is no guarantee that M is also a Γ2-molecule.
For instance, if (Γ2 6= Γ1 and) in position Γ1 the player ⊤ made a replicative move in
the ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ component of the game which split (i.e. extended to w0 and
w1) the leaf w of the Γ1-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree, then w would be just an
internal node rather than a complete branch of the Γ2-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree,
meaning that M = ⌊X˘j⌋w is not a residual molecule of Γ2. Instead of ⌊X˘j⌋w, in the
general case, Γ2 could have many residual molecules of the form ⌊X˘j⌋w
′
, where w  w′.
Let us agree to say about each such Γ2-molecule ⌊X˘j⌋w
′
that it descends from ⌊X˘j⌋w,
or that ⌊X˘j⌋w is the Γ1-predecessor — or simply a predecessor if we do not care
about details — of ⌊X˘j⌋
w′ . Similarly for the cases when M is ⌊Y˘j⌋
w, ⌊Z˘j⌋
w, ⌊Q˘j⌋
w or
⌊R˘j⌋w. And rather similarly for the caseM = ⌊P˘j⌋wu : in this caseM will be said to be
the Γ1-predecessor (or just a predecessor) of every Γ2-molecule ⌊P˘j⌋w
′
u′ such that
w  w′ and u  u′; and, correspondingly, every such ⌊P˘j⌋
w′
u′ will be said to descend
from ⌊P˘j⌋wu . Extending this terminology to the remaining case ofM = ⌊W˘ ⌋, the latter
is always its own (single) descendant and predecessor.
Here comes some more terminology. In the context of a given legal position Γ of
(10), where M is a virgin Γ-molecule, to devirginize M intuitively means to make a
(legal) move that makes M devirginized; we say that such a move is patient if M is
the only molecule whose content it modifies. Informally speaking, a patient move for
a non-⌊W ⌋-metatype molecule M means that the move is made in the corresponding
leaf (or two nested leaves if M is ⌊P ⌋-metatype) rather than internal node(s) of the
corresponding underlying BT(s), for a move in an internal node v would simultaneously
affect several molecules — all those that are associated with leaves r such that v  r.
In precise terms, we have:
• To devirginize ⌊W˘⌋ means to make the move 2.a for some constant a. This sort
of a move is automatically patient.
• To devirginize ⌊X˘j⌋w (resp. ⌊Y˘j⌋w, resp. ⌊Z˘j⌋w) means to make the move
1.j.w′.1.1.a (resp. 1.j.w′.1.2.a, resp. 1.j.w′.2.a) for some bitstring w′  w and
some constant a. Such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To devirginize ⌊Q˘j⌋w (resp. ⌊R˘j⌋w) means to make the move 1.i.w′.1.2.a (resp.
1.i.w′.2.a) for i = s+ j, some bitstring w′  w and some constant a. Again, such
a move is patient iff w′ = w.
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• To devirginize ⌊P˘j⌋wu means to make the move 1.i.w
′.1.1.u′.a for i = s+ j, some
bitstrings w′  w and u′  u, and some constant a. Such a move patient iff both
w′ = w and u′ = u.
Notice that player ⊤ can only devirginize positive molecules, while player ⊥ can
only devirginize negative molecules. Every devirginizing move thus has the form α.a for
some constant a. Let us call such a constant a the choice constant of the devirginizing
move. Then we say that a given act (move) of devirginization is done diversifyingly
iff the move is patient, and its choice constant is the smallest constant that has never
been used before in the play (run) as the choice constant of some devirginizing move.
7.3 The counterstrategy E
In this subsection we set up a counterstrategy for (10) in the form of an EPM E , which
will act in the role of ⊥ in a play over (10). E is a universal counterstrategy for (10), in
the sense that, as will be shown later, no HPM wins (10)⋆ against this particular, one-
for-all EPM for the yet-to-be-constructed interpretation ⋆. Since E plays as ⊥ rather
than ⊤, we will be interested in the run cospelled rather than spelled by any given
computation branch of E . That is, in a play, the moves made by E get the label ⊥, and
the moves made by its adversary get the label ⊤. In our description of E and the further
analysis of its behavior, we will be relying on the clean environment assumption.
According to it, the adversary of a given agent (the adversary of E specifically) never
makes illegal moves. As pointed out in [10], such an assumption is perfectly safe and
legitimate for, if the adversary makes an illegal move, then E will be the winner no
matter what happens afterwards, and making E the winner is the very purpose of our
construction. From the definition of E it will be also immediately clear that E itself
does not make any illegal moves either. Since all runs that E generates are thus legal,
we usually omit the word “legal”, and by a run or position we will always mean a legal
run or position of (10).
The work of E consists in sequentially performing the first two or all three (depend-
ing on how things evolve) of the following procedures FIRST, SECOND and THIRD.
In the descriptions of these procedures, “current” should be understood as Φ-residual,
where Φ is the position of the play at the time when a given step is performed. This
word may be omitted, and by just saying “molecule” we mean current molecule. Sim-
ilarly, “virgin”, “(matchingly) devirginized”, “devirginize”, etc. should be understood
in the context of the then-current position. Also, since the current position is always a
position (finite run), it is safe to say “leaf” instead of “complete branch” when talking
about bitstring trees in our description of the work of E .
PROCEDURE FIRST: Diversifyingly devirginize all ⌊P ⌋-metatype molecules,
and go to SECOND.
PROCEDURE SECOND: If ⌊W˘ ⌋ is matchingly devirginized, go to THIRD. Else
perform each of the following routines:
Routine 1. For each j and each leaf w of the current ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree,
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whenever both ⌊X˘j⌋w and ⌊Y˘j⌋w are matchingly devirginized and ⌊Z˘j⌋w is virgin,
diversifyingly devirginize ⌊Z˘j⌋w.
Routine 2. For each j and each leaf w of the current ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋-
tree, whenever ⌊Q˘j⌋
w is matchingly devirginized and ⌊R˘j⌋
w is virgin, diversifyingly
devirginize ⌊R˘j⌋w.
Routine 3. Grant permission, and repeat SECOND.
PROCEDURE THIRD: Diversifyingly devirginize all ⌊Z⌋- and ⌊R⌋-metatype vir-
gin molecules, and go into an infinite loop within a permission state.
Remember that a fair EPM is one whose every e-computation branch (any valuation
e) is fair, i.e. permission is granted infinitely many times in each branch. Before we go
any further, let us make the straightforward observation that
E is a fair EPM. (11)
This is so because THIRD grants permission infinitely many times, and if THIRD is
never reached by E , then SECOND will be iterated infinitely many times, with each
iteration granting permission in Routine 3.
Our ultimate goal is to show that (10) is not valid, which, as mentioned, will
be achieved by finding an interpretation ⋆ such that no HPM wins (10)⋆ against E .
We approach this goal by first proving the weaker fact that (10) is not uniformly
valid. In particular, below we are going to show that, for any valuation e and any
e-computation branch B of E , there is an interpretation † such that the run cospelled
by B is a ⊥-won run of (10)†. As will be observed at the beginning of Subsection 7.6,
this fact immediately implies the non-uniform-validity of (10). Such a B-depending
counterinterpretation is going to be what in [8] was called perfect, in our particular
case meaning that for any predicate letter A˙ of (10), A˙†(x) is a finitary predicate that
does not depend on any variables except x. This can be easily seen to make A˘† and
hence (10)† a constant game, allowing us to safely ignore the valuation parameter e
in most contexts, which is irrelevant because neither the game e[A˘†] nor (notice) the
work of E depends on e. To define such an interpretation, it is sufficient to indicate
what constant atomic formulas are made by it true and what constant atomic formulas
are made false. Here and later, for simplicity, by “constant atomic formulas” we mean
formulas of the form A˙(a), where A˙ is a predicate letter occurring in (10) and a is a
constant. For obvious reasons, how † interprets any other atoms is irrelevant, and we
may safely pretend that such atoms simply do not exist in the language.
So, fix any valuation e spelled on the valuation tape of E , and any e-computation
branch B of E . Let Γ be the run cospelled by B. Let us agree to say “ultimate”
(run, position, tree) for “Γ-residual” (run, position, tree). To Γ itself we refer as the
ultimate run of ⌊(10)⌋, or simply the ultimate run. By just saying “molecule”
we mean a residual molecule of Γ or of any initial segment of it. And Γ-molecules
we call ultimate molecules. Any molecule would thus be an ultimate molecule or a
predecessor of such. When M is an ultimate molecule, by just saying that M is virgin,
devirginized or matchingly devirginized we mean that M is so in Γ.
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We will say that the branch B is short iff, in the process of playing it up, E never
entered the THIRD stage, thus forever remaining in SECOND. Otherwise B is long.
The scope of all this B- and Γ-dependent terminology extends to the following two
subsections, throughout which B and Γ are fixed.
Our construction of a counterinterpretation for (10) depends on whether B is short
or long. We consider these two cases separately.
7.4 Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is short
Assume B is short. This, looking at the first line of the description of SECOND, means
that, in the ultimate run of ⌊(10)⌋ (in Γ, that is), W˘ is not matchingly devirginized.
We select our
counterinterpretation †
to be the perfect interpretation that makes the contents of all positive non-matchingly
devirginized ultimate molecules false, and all other constant atomic formulas true.
Convention 7.3
• Where A˙ is a predicate letter of (10) and a is any constant, we say that A˙(a) is
true iff A˙†(a) is true.
• We say that ⌊(10)⌋ is true iff the ultimate run of ⌊(10)⌋ is a ⊤-won run of (10)†.
• We say that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is true iff the ultimate position of ⌊W˘ ⌋ is a ⊤-won position of
W˘ †.
• We say that ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ is true iff the ultimate run of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋
is a ⊤-won run of
(
◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)
)†
. Similarly for ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j
)
⌋.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree, we say
that ⌊Z˘j⌋w is true iff the ultimate run (position) of ⌊Z˘j⌋w is a ⊤-won run of Z˘
†
j .
Similarly for ⌊X˘j⌋w, ⌊Y˘j⌋w, ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w, ⌊Q˘j⌋w, ⌊R˘j⌋w, ⌊◦
| P˘j → Q˘j⌋w.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → Z˘j
)
⌋-tree and
u is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree, we say that ⌊P˘j⌋wu is true iff
the ultimate position of ⌊P˘j⌋
w
u is a ⊤-won position of P˘
†
j .
“False” will mean “not true”.
Based on the definition of⊔, with a moment’s thought we can see that the following
claim is valid:
Claim 7.4 Let M be an arbitrary ultimate molecule.
(i) If M is virgin, then M is false.
(ii) If M is devirginized, then M is true iff its content is true.
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Our goal is to show that ⌊(10)⌋ is false.
Note that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is guaranteed to be false. Indeed, if ⌊W˘⌋ is virgin, it is false by
Claim 7.4(i). And, if ⌊W˘ ⌋ is devirginized, then, as no switch to THIRD has occured,
⌊W˘⌋ must be non-matchingly devirginized. Then, with Claim 7.4(ii) in mind, ⌊W˘⌋ can
be seen to be false by our choice of †.
As ⌊W˘ ⌋ is false, in order to show that ⌊(10)⌋ is false, it would suffice to verify that,
for each j, both ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ and ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋ are true. Why this
would suffice can be seen directly from the definitions of ∧ and →. In turn, based on
the definition of ◦
| , the truth of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋ and ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j
)
⌋ means
nothing but that:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree, ⌊X˘j∧ Y˘j →
Z˘j⌋
w is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree,
⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j⌋w is true.
Pick any j, and assume w is as in (a). If ⌊Z˘j⌋w is devirginized, then, with Claim
7.4(ii) in mind, it is true. This is so because, by our choice of †, only the contents
of positive non-matchingly devirginized (ultimate) molecules are made false by this
interpretation; ⌊Z˘j⌋w is not positive, nor is its content the same as that of some positive
non-matchingly devirginized ultimate molecule, for then that molecule would not be
non-matchingly devirginized. The truth of ⌊Z˘j⌋w, in turn, by the definition of →,
can be seen to imply the truth of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⌋w. Suppose now ⌊Z˘j⌋w is virgin.
Analyzing how E acts in Routine 1 of SECOND, the fact that ⌊Z˘j⌋w is not devirginized
can be seen to indicate that at least one of the two molecules ⌊X˘j⌋
w and ⌊Y˘j⌋
w — let
us assume it is ⌊X˘j⌋w — is not matchingly devirginized. If ⌊X˘j⌋w is virgin, it is false
as are all virgin molecules. And if ⌊X˘j⌋w is non-matchingly devirginized, it is again
false by our choice of †. In either case ⌊X˘j⌋
w is thus false and hence, as can be seen
from the definition of ∧, so is ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w. This, in turn, by the definition of →, makes
⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⌋w true. Statement (a) is taken care of.
Assume now w is as in (b). If ⌊R˘j⌋w is devirginized, then we are done for the
same reasons as in the previous paragraph when discussing the similar case for ⌊Z˘j⌋w.
Suppose now ⌊R˘j⌋w is virgin. Reasoning as we did in the corresponding case of the
previous paragraph for ⌊X˘j⌋w (only appealing to Routine 2 of SECOND instead of
Routine 1), we find that ⌊Q˘j⌋w is false. Therefore, in order to conclude that ⌊(◦
| P˘j →
Q˘j) → R˘j⌋w is true, it remains to show that ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w is true. The truth of ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w
means nothing but that, for every complete branch u of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree,
⌊P˘j⌋
w
u is true. But this is indeed so. Consider any complete branch u of the ultimate
⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree. ⌊P˘j⌋wu is devirginized due to the actions of E during FIRST. And, as this
molecule is negative, it can be seen to be true by our choice of †. Statement (b) is thus
also taken care of.
So, ⌊(10)⌋ is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (10)†, i.e. Wn(10)
†
〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
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7.5 Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is long
Throughout this subsection, we assume B is long, meaning that ⌊W˘⌋ is matchingly
devirginized and thus, at some point of playing B up, E switched from SECOND to
THIRD. We let ∆ denote the (finite) initial segment of our ultimate run Γ consisting
of all of the (lab)moves made before this switch to THIRD occurred.
By a supermolecule we mean a devirginized residual molecule M of some subpo-
sition (i.e. a finite initial segment) Φ of Γ such that for no proper initial segment Ψ
of Φ is the Ψ-predecessor of M devirginized. We refer to such a Φ as the position of
devirginization ofM , and refer to the length of Φ as the time of devirginization of
M . Next, if here Φ is not longer than ∆, we say thatM is an OGSM (Old-Generation
SuperMolecule). Intuitively, OGSMs are molecules that lost their innocence while E
was still acting within FIRST or SECOND. Note that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is an OGSM.
Obviously any devirginized residual moleculeM (of Γ or any of its initial segments)
descends from some unique supermolecule. We call the supermolecule from which M
descends the essence of M . Every supermolecule is thus its own essence. Only de-
virginized molecules have essences. Therefore, if we say “the essence of M”, the claim
that M is devirginized is automatically implied. Whether a devirginized molecule M
is a supermolecule or not, by the position of devirginization and time of de-
virginization of M we mean those of the essence of M . Intuitively, the position of
devirginization of such an M is the position in which M — more precisely, a prede-
cessor of M — first became devirginized, and the time of devirginization tells us how
soon after the start of the play this happened. Mark the obvious fact that the content
of any devirginized molecule is the same as that of the essence of that molecule.
Claim 7.5 No two different negative supermolecules have identical contents.
Proof. This is so because negative molecules are devirginized by E , which always
does devirginization in a diversifying way — in a way that ensures that the content of
the resulting molecule is different from that of any other devirginized molecule. ✷
We define a chain as any nonempty finite sequence 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 of OGSMs such
that:
1. M1 and only M1 is ⌊P ⌋-metatype.
2. For each odd k with 1 ≤ k < m, Mk is negative, Mk+1 is positive, and the two
OGSMs have identical contents.
3. For each odd k with 3 ≤ k ≤ m, we have:
• ifMk = ⌊Z˘j⌋w (some j, w), thenMk−1 is the essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w or the essence
of ⌊Y˘j⌋w;
• if Mk = ⌊R˘j⌋w (some j, w), then Mk−1 is the essence of ⌊Q˘j⌋w.
As an aside, observe that, according to the above definition, if ⌊W˘ ⌋ is in a chain,
then it can only be the last element of the chain, and such a chain is of an even
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length. All internal (neither the first nor the last) odd-numbered elements of a chain
are ⌊Z⌋- or ⌊R⌋-metatype, and all internal even-numbered elements are ⌊X⌋-, ⌊Y ⌋- or
⌊Q⌋-metatype.
We say that a chain 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 is open iff, where ⌊Pj⌋ is the metatype of M1,
no element of the chain has the metatype ⌊Qj⌋ (for the same j).
For an OGSM M , by Base(M) we denote the set of all atoms Pj of (9) such that
there is an open chain 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 with M1 being Pj-type and Mm =M .
Now remember our assumption that Int◦- does not prove (8). By the completeness
with respect to Kripke semantics, this means that there is a tree-like Kripke model
(W ,R, |≡ ) such that (8) is false in the root world root of it. Obviously here we may
assume that every formula of the antecedent of (8) is true in root, while W is false. We
consider this model and its root world root fixed throughout this section.
Claim 7.6 Suppose M is a negative A-type (A ∈ {Pj , Rj , Zj | 1 ≤ j ≤ s}) OGSM,
and p is a world with p |≡Base(M). Then p |≡A.
Proof. Let M , A, p be as above, and let Φ be the position of devirginization of
M . We proceed by induction on the time of devirginization of M , i.e. the length of Φ.
There are three cases to consider, depending on the metatype of M .
Case 1: M is ⌊P ⌋-metatype. Then Base(M) = {A}, and hence this case is trivial.
Case 2: M is ⌊Z⌋-metatype, specifically, M = ⌊Z˘j⌋w. As every formula of the
antecedent of (8) is true in root, those formulas remain true in all worlds. In particular,
p |≡Xj ◦– (Yj ◦–Zj). Hence, in order to show that p |≡Zj, it would be sufficient to
verify that p |≡Xj and p |≡ Yj . From an analysis of Routine 1 of SECOND it can be
seen that the Φ-molecule ⌊X˘j⌋w is matchingly devirginized, for otherwise E would not
have devirginized ⌊Z˘j⌋w. So, there is a negative Φ-molecule N with the same content as
⌊X˘j⌋w. The time of devirginization of N is, of course, smaller than that ofM , because
(⌊X˘j⌋w and hence) N would have to be already devirginized by the time when M lost
innocence. Let K be the essence of N . As (N and hence) K has the same content as
⌊X˘j⌋w, the type of K should be Xj . Now, notice that Base(K) ⊆ Base(M). This is
so because every open chain 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 with Mm = K remains an open chain after
adding to it the essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w and then M . Hence our assumption p |≡Base(M)
implies p |≡Base(K). And, since the time of devirginization of (N and hence of) K is
smaller that of M , the induction hypothesis yields p |≡Xj. A similar argument shows
that we also have p |≡ Yj .
Case 3: M is ⌊R⌋-metatype, specifically, M = ⌊R˘j⌋w. We want to show that
p |≡Pj ◦–Qj, from which p |≡Rj follows for reasons similar to those pointed out in
the previous case. For a contradiction, assume p /|≡Pj ◦–Qj . Then there is a world q
accessible from p such that q |≡ Pj and q /|≡Qj. From Routine 2 of SECOND we see
that the Φ-molecule ⌊Q˘j⌋w should be matchingly devirginized (otherwise E would not
have devirginized M). Arguing as we did in Case 2 for ⌊X˘j⌋w, we find that there is
a negative OGSM K whose type is Qj and whose time of devirginization is smaller
than that of M . Every element of Base(K), except perhaps Pj , can be seen to be also
an element of Base(M). Therefore, remembering that q |≡ Pj , in conjunction with our
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assumption that p |≡Base(M) and hence q |≡Base(M), we find q |≡Base(K). This,
by the induction hypothesis, implies q |≡Qj , which is a contradiction. ✷
Claim 7.7 ⌊W˘ ⌋ is in some open chain.
Proof. Since B is long, ⌊W˘ ⌋ is matchingly devirginized (already) in ∆. Let N be
a negative devirginized ∆-molecule whose content is identical with that of ⌊W˘ ⌋, and
let M be the essence of N . The type of (N and hence) M , of course, should be W .
Remember that root /|≡W . Therefore, by Claim 7.6, root /|≡Base(M). Consequently,
Base(M) 6= ∅, for otherwise we would vacuously have root |≡Base(M). The fact that
Base(M) is nonempty means that there is an open chain 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 withMm =M .
The result of adding ⌊W˘ ⌋ to that chain obviously remains an open chain. ✷
Let us select and fix some — say, lexicographically the smallest — open chain
〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 with Mm = ⌊W˘ ⌋, and call it the master chain. According to
Claim 7.7, such a chain exists. Let us call the OGSMs that are in the master chain
master OGSMs.
Now we are ready to define the
counterinterpretation †.
We define it as the perfect interpretation that makes the content of each master OGSM
false, and makes all other constant atomic formulas true.
In what follows, we fully adopt the terminology of Convention 7.3, with the only
difference that now the underlying interpretation † on which that terminology is based
is † as defined in the present subsection rather than as defined in Subsection 7.4. As
in Subsection 7.4, our goal is to show that ⌊(10)⌋ is false.
That ⌊W˘ ⌋ is false is immediate from our choice of †. Hence, in order to show that
⌊(10)⌋ is false, it would suffice to verify that, for each j, we have:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j)⌋-tree, ⌊X˘j∧ Y˘j →
Z˘j⌋w is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree,
⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j⌋w is true.
Pick any j, and assume w is as in (a). ⌊Z˘j⌋w is devirginized at least due to the
actions of E during THIRD (in case it otherwise managed to stay virgin throughout
SECOND). If the essence of ⌊Z˘j⌋w is not in the master chain, then its content is
true, because the latter, in view of Claim 7.5 and with a little thought, can be seen
to be different from the content of any master OGSM, and, by our choice of †, this
interpretation only falsifies the contents of master OGSMs. In turn, from the truth
of the content of the essence of ⌊Z˘j⌋
w and hence the truth of ⌊Z˘j⌋
w we infer that
⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⌋w is true. Suppose now the essence of ⌊Z˘j⌋w is in the master chain.
Then, from the definition of chain and with some thought, we can see that either the
essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w or the essence of ⌊Y˘j⌋w should be there, too. Specifically, such a
molecule would be the one immediately preceeding the essence of ⌊Zj⌋w in the master
30
chain. Hence, by our choice of †, either ⌊X˘j⌋w or ⌊Y˘j⌋w is false, which makes ⌊Z˘j∧Y˘j →
Z˘j⌋w true.
Assume now w is as in (b). As was the case with ⌊Z˘j⌋
w in the previous paragraph,
⌊R˘j⌋w is devirginized, and, if the essence of ⌊R˘j⌋w is not in the master chain, then its
content and hence ⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j⌋w is true. Suppose now the essence of ⌊R˘j⌋w is
in the master chain. Arguing as we did in the previous case for ⌊X˘j⌋
w or ⌊Y˘j⌋
w, we find
that the essence of ⌊Q˘j⌋w is a master OGSM and hence ⌊Q˘j⌋w is false. Therefore, in
order to conclude that ⌊(◦
| P˘j → Q˘j)→ R˘j⌋w true, it would suffice to show that ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w
is true. The truth of ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w means nothing but that, for every complete branch u of
the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree, ⌊P˘j⌋wu is true. But this is indeed so. Consider any complete
branch u of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘j⌋w-tree. ⌊P˘j⌋wu is devirginized due to the actions during
FIRST. Its essence cannot be in the master chain because the essence of ⌊Q˘j⌋w is there
and the master chain is open. But then, in view of Claim 7.5, the content of ⌊P˘j⌋wu is
different from that of any master OGSM, which, by our choice of †, makes ⌊P˘j⌋wu true.
Statement (b) is thus also taken care of.
So, ⌊(10)⌋ is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (10)†, i.e. Wn(10)
†
〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
7.6 From non-uniform-validity to non-validity
In the previous two subsections we in fact showed that
(10) is not uniformly valid. (12)
Indeed, suppose, for a contradiction, that (10) is uniformly valid. Let then H be a
uniform solution for (10) — an HPM that wins (10)∗ for every interpretation ∗. Pick
an arbitrary valuation e (which is irrelevant here anyway), and let B be the (E , e,H)-
branch. As observed in (11), E is fair, so the conditions of Lemma 4.1 are met and
such a branch B is defined. Let then † be the interpretation constructed from B as in
Subsection 7.4 or 7.5, depending on whether B is short or long. Then, as we showed
in those two subsections, the run Γ cospelled by B is a ⊤-lost run of (10)† (= e[(10)†],
because the interpretation is perfect). But, by Lemma 4.1, the same Γ is a run spelled
by some e-computation branch of H — specifically, it is the H vs. E run on e. This
means that H does not win (10)†, contrary to our assumption that H is a uniform
solution for (10).
In turn, (12) can be eventually rather easily translated into the fact of completeness
of Int◦- with respect to uniform validity.
Our goal, however, is to show the completeness of Int◦- with respect to validity
rather than just uniform validity — the goal which, as we remember, has been re-
duced to showing the non-validity of (10). The fact of non-validity of (10), of course,
is stronger than the fact of its non-uniform-validity. The point is that the counter-
interpretation † constructed in Subsections 7.4 and 7.5 depends on the computation
branch B and hence on the HPM H that plays against E . That is, different Hs could
require different †s. In order to show that (10) is not valid, we need to construct a one,
common-for-all-H counterinterpretation ⋆, with the property that every HPM H loses
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(10)⋆ against E for that very interpretation ⋆ on some valuation e. Not to worry, we
can handle that.
Let us fix the sequence
H1, H2, H3, . . .
of all HPMs, enumerated according to the lexicographic order of their standardized
descriptions. Next, we select a variable z different from x and, for each constant c,
define
ec
to be the valuation that sends z to c, and (arbitrarily) sends all other variables to 1.
For each constant c, let
Bc
be the (E , ec,Hc)-branch, and let
Γc
be the run cospelled by Bc, i.e. (by Lemma 4.1) the Hc vs. E run on ec.
Next, for any constant c, let
‡c
be the interpretation constructed from Bc and Γc in the way we constructed the inter-
pretation † from B and Γ in:
Subsection 7.4 if Bc is short;
Subsection 7.5 if Bc is long.
From the results of Subsections 7.4 and 7.5 we thus have:
For any constant c, Wn(10)
‡c
〈Γc〉 = ⊥. (13)
Consider any atom A˙(x) of (10). For each particular constant c, the predicate
A˙‡c(x) is unary, depending only on x. But if here c is seen as a variable and, as such,
renamed into z, then the predicate becomes binary, depending on x and z. Let us
denote such a predicate by A¨(x, z). That is, we define A¨(x, z) as the predicate such
that, for any constants a and c,
A¨(a, c) = A˙‡c(a).
We now define our ultimate
counterinterpretation ⋆
by stipulating that, for any atom A˙(x) of (10),9 A˙⋆(x) is nothing but the above pred-
icate A¨(x, z). Note that, unlike ‡c (any particular constant c), ⋆ is not a perfect
interpretation, for A˙⋆(x) depends on the “hidden” variable z.
9As noted for † in Subsection 7.3, how ⋆ interprets the atoms that are not in (10) is irrelevant and
not worth bothering at this point.
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Claim 7.8 For any constant c, (10)‡c = ec[(10)
⋆].
Proof. Consider any predicate letter A˙ of (10), and any constant c. We claim
that (
⊔xA˙(x)
)‡c
= ec[
(
⊔xA˙(x)
)⋆
]. (14)
The above two games can be rewritten as⊔xA˙‡c(x) and ec[⊔xA˙⋆(x)], respectively.
ec[⊔xA˙⋆(x)] can be further rewritten as ec[⊔xA¨(x, z)]. Thus, in order to verify (14),
we need to show that
⊔xA˙‡c(x) = ec[⊔xA¨(x, z)]. (15)
As noted earlier,⊔xA˙‡c(x) is a constant game due to the fact that the interpretation
‡c is perfect. So, it is its own instance, and ⊔xA˙‡c(x) can be safely written instead of
e[⊔xA˙‡c(x)] for whatever (irrelevant) valuation e. Of course, the two games of (15)
have the same legal runs, with every such run being 〈〉 or 〈⊤a〉 for some constant a. So,
we only need to verify that the Wn components of those two games are also identical.
And, of course, considering only legal runs when comparing the two Wn components
is sufficient. Furthermore, the empty run is a ⊥-won run of both games. So, we only
need to focus on legal runs of length 1. Consider any such run 〈⊤a〉. By the definition
of ⊔, Wn⊔xA˙‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff WnA˙‡c(a)〈〉 = ⊤; in turn, WnA˙‡c(a)〈〉 = ⊤ means
nothing but that A˙‡c(a) is true; and, by the definition of A¨, A˙‡c(a) = A¨(a, c). Thus,
Wn⊔xA˙
‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff A¨(a, c) is true. (16)
Next, again by the definition of ⊔, we have
Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉 =Wn
A¨(a,z)
ec
〈〉.
As A¨(a, z) only depends on z and ec sends this variable to c, we also have ec[A¨(a, z)] =
A¨(a, c). And, of course, WnA¨(a,c)〈〉 = ⊤ means nothing but that A¨(a, c) is true. So,
Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff A¨(a, c) is true.
The above, together with (16), implies
Wn⊔xA˙
‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 =Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉,
thus completing our proof of (15) and hence of (14).
Now, by induction, (14) extends from formulas of the form ⊔xA˙(x) to all more
complex subformulas of (10) including (10) itself, meaning that (10)‡c = ec[(10)
⋆].
The steps of this induction are straightforward, because each of the operations ⋆, ‡c
and ec[. . .] commutes with each of the connectives ∧, ◦
| and →. ✷
Putting (13) and Claim 7.8 together, we find that, for any constant c, Γc is a ⊥-won
run of ec[(10)
⋆]. Now, remember that Γc is the Hc vs. E run on ec, according to Lemma
4.1 meaning that Γc is the run spelled by an ec-computation branch of Hc. So, every
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Hc loses (10)⋆ on valuation ec, i.e. no Hc wins (10)⋆. But every HPM is Hc for some
c. Thus, no HPM wins (10)⋆. In other words, (10) is not valid.
This almost completes our proof of the main Claim 7.2 and hence our proof of the
main Lemma 7.1 and hence our proof of the completeness of Int◦-. What remains
to verify for the official completion of our proof of Theorem 3.1 for Int◦- is that ⋆
satisfies the complexity condition of Claim 7.2. Such a verification is given in the
following subsection.
7.7 The complexity of the counterinterpretation ⋆
The counterinterpretation ⋆ constructed in the previous subsection interprets each atom
A˙(x) of (10) as the binary predicate A¨(x, z). With “true in the sense of Subsection 7.4
(resp. 7.5)” below understood as truth in the sense of the corresponding subsection
where Bc is taken in the role of B (and, accordingly, Γc in the role of Γ) when con-
structing the counterinterpretation † from it, the meaning of the proposition A¨(a, c)
for any given constants a, c is in fact the disjunction of the following two statements:
1. “Bc is short and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 7.4”;
2. “Bc is long and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 7.5”.
Note that arbitrarily long initial segments of Bc can be effectively constructed from
c. This can be done by first constructing the machine Hc from number c, and then
tracing, step by step, how the play between Hc and E evolves on valuation ec according
to the scenario described in the proof idea for Lemma 4.1. This makes it clear that the
predicate “Bc is long” (with c here treated as a variable) is of complexity Σ1, because it
says nothing but that there is a computation step in Bc at which ⌊W˘ ⌋ gets matchingly
devirginized.
Next, “Bc is short” is just the negation of “Bc is long”.
Next, some thought can show “A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 7.4” (with
a, together with the hidden c, here treated as a variable) to mean nothing but that
there is no computation step in Bc at which A˙(a) becomes the content of some positive
non-matchingly devirginized residual molecule of the then-current position. So this is
the negation of a Σ1-predicate.
Finally, “A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 7.5” means that there is a —
lexicographically smallest — open chain C whose last element is ⌊W˘ ⌋, and A˙(a) is not
the content of anything in C. With a little thought we can see that, to find such a
chain C, it would be sufficient to trace Bc only up to the computation step at which
⌊W˘⌋ gets devirginized. So, the complexity of the predicate “A˙(a) is true in the sense
of Subsection 7.5” is Σ1.
To summarize, where A˙(x) is an atom of (10), A¨(x, z), i.e A˙⋆(x), is indeed a Boolean
combination of Σ1-predicates. As for all other elementary atoms, we may make arbi-
trary assumptions — without affecting the incomputability of (10)⋆ — about how
they are interpreted by ⋆. So, we assume that they, too, are interpreted as Boolean
combinations of Σ1-predicates.
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8 From ◦− to >−
In this section we prove the remaining completeness part of Theorem 3.1 for Int
>-.
The following is an important lemma for our proof:
Lemma 8.1 ⊢⊢◦
|G→ ∧|G, for any formula G of the language of affine logic.
Proof. The lemma will be proven by constructing an EPM C such that, for any
static game G, C |= ◦
|G→ ∧|G. This, of course, immediately implies that we also have
C⊢⊢◦
|G→ ∧|G for any formula G.
Thinking of ∧|G as the infinite conjunction G ∧ G ∧ . . ., and thinking of any legal
play over ◦
|G → ∧|G as consisting of two runs — one in the antecedent and one in
the consequent, the idea of the work of C, in intuitive terms, is the following. Every
once in a while, in the antecedent, C makes a replicative move in the leaf 00 . . . 0 of
the underlying bitstring tree. These are all replicative moves it makes, so that, in the
eventual run Υ of ◦
|G, all of the strings 1, 01, 001, 0001, . . . will be leaves of Tree◦
..
.
G〈Υ〉
(and the only additional complete branch will be the infinite string of 0s). With each
such leaf 0m1, C associates conjunct #m + 1 of ∧|G, and uses the copy-cat strategy
between that conjunct and the copy of G in leaf 0m1. There can be some delays here in
mimicking adversary’s moves, but this is OK as G is static. Such a one-to-one matching
guarantees that if G is won by the adversary in all leaves of the bitstring tree generated
in the antecedent, then all conjuncts of ∧|G in the consequent are won by C. In other
words, if the adversary wins in ◦
|G, then C is sure to win in ∧|G. This translates into C
being the winner in ◦
|G→ ∧|G.
In precise terms, here is the strategy that C follows, with k and Φ being variables
initialized 1 and 〈〉, respectively:
PROCEDURE LOOP: Let w = 0k−1 (the string of k − 1 zeros). Perform the
following steps:
Step 1. Make the move 1.w: .
Step 2. Where (Φ1.)w1 = 〈⊥α1, . . . ,⊥αm〉 and (Φ2.)k. = 〈⊥β1, . . . ,⊥βn〉, make
each of the moves 2.k.α1 , . . . , 2.k.αm , 1.w1.β1 , . . . , 1.w1.βn .
Step 3. Grant permission. If the adversary responds by a move γ, then:
(i) if γ = 2.j.δ for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then make the move 1.u.δ, where u = 0j−11 ;
(ii) if γ = 1.v.δ for some bitstring v, then, for each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
v  0j−11, make the move 2.j.δ .
Step 4. Increment k by one, update Φ to the current position of the play, and
repeat LOOP.
Some additional informal explanations would help. In Step 1, C replicates leaf 0k−1
of (the underlying BT-structure of) the antecedent, thus creating two new leaves 0k
and 0k−11. 0k is just reserved for further replications, and otherwise C does not care
about it. As for 0k−11, it is “final” in that it will never be replicated in the future, thus
forever remaining a leaf. To this leaf corresponds the kth conjunct of the consequent,
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in the sense that throughout the rest of the play, C will try, mimicking the adversary’s
moves, to keep the run of G in the kth conjunct of the consequent identical with the
run of G in leaf 0k−11 of the antecedent. Before this leaf was created, however, the
adversary might have already made some moves β1, . . . , βn in the kth conjunct of the
consequent, as well as some moves whose effect was making moves α1, . . . , αm in the
(then-future) leaf w1 of the antecedent. C itself has not made any moves in those
components during the previous iterations of LOOP, as at that time it did not treat k
as “active”. Following the motto better late than never, during Step 2, C tries to catch
up by copying the adversary’s moves made in the kth conjunct of the consequent in the
corresponding leaf 0k−11 of the antecedent, and vice versa. This does not guarantee
that the corresponding two runs of G will be fully identical, but it does guarantee that,
at least, one will be a ⊤-delay of the other, and this is just as good as if they were
identical. During Step 3, for the sake of fairness, C lets the adversary make a move and,
as long as such a move is a move in an “already activated” (i.e. ≤ kth) conjunct of the
consequent, or (the effect of the move is) in some already existing final leaves of the
antecedent, the machine copies that move in the corresponding leaf of the antecedent
or the corresponding conjuncts of the consequent.
In trying to verify that the above strategy is successful, as always, we may rely
on the clean environment assumption, ruling out the possibility that the adversary
ever makes illegal moves. It is not hard to see that then the machine does not make
illegal moves either, so that we can narrow our attention down to legal runs only.
Consider the run Γ spelled by an arbitrary e-computation branch (whatever valuation
e) of C. Since LOOP is iterated infinitely many times and permission is granted once
in each iteration, such a branch is fair. So, we just need to show that Γ is a ⊤-
won run of e[◦
|G → ∧|G] = ◦
| e[G] → ∧| e[G]. For convenience, we may assume here
that G is a constant game so that e[G] = G, or otherwise just rename e[G] into G.
Thus, what we want to show is that Wn◦
..
.
G→∧.
..
G〈Γ〉 = ⊤, which can be rephrased as
Wn
◦
...¬G∨∧.
..
G〈Γ〉 = ⊤. As we agreed a while ago, here we can and do assume that Γ is a
legal run of ◦
|G→ ∧|G.
If Wn∧
..
.
G〈Γ2.〉 = ⊤, we are done. Suppose now Wn∧
..
.
G〈Γ2.〉 = ⊥. This means that,
for some i (i ≥ 1), Γ2.i is a ⊥-won run of G. Hence ¬Γ2.i is a ⊤-won run of ¬G. Now,
a little analysis of LOOP can convince us that, where w = 0i−11, (Γ1.)w is a ⊤-delay
of ¬Γ2.i. Therefore, as we deal with a static game, (Γ1.)w, too, is a ⊤-won run of ¬G.
This implies that Wn
◦
..
.¬G〈Γ1.〉 = ⊤. Hence Wn
◦
..
.¬G∨∧.
..
G〈Γ〉 = ⊤. Done. ✷
In Sections 5 and 6 we defined the notions of standardization and desequentization
for formulas and sequents of the language of Int◦-. The same concepts straightfor-
wardly extend to Int
>--formulas and Int>--sequents, with just ◦– replaced by >– and
◦
| by ∧| in the definitions.
Lemma 8.2 Assume K is an Int
>--formula, and D is the desequentization of the
standardization of K. Then, for any interpretation ∗ with |= K∗, we have |= D∗.
Proof. This is an exact copy of Lemma 6.1, only with Int
>- instead of Int◦-.
Our proof of Lemma 6.1 relied on the fact that computability is closed under the rule
36
“from A to ◦
|A”. The same closure principle holds with ∧| instead of ◦
| , as known from
(the same) Section 13 of [10]. Everything else in the proof of Lemma 6.1 exclusively
relied on the soundness of affine logic and certain syntactic facts about affine logic
and implicative intuitionistic logic. But neither logic does syntactically discriminate
between ◦– and >– , or between ◦| and ∧| . This means that our proof of Lemma 6.1
goes through for the present Lemma 8.2 virtually without any changes except just
replacing ◦
| by ∧| and ◦– by >– everywhere in the text of the proof. ✷
Now consider any Int
>--formula which is not provable in Int>-. Let us denote it
by K >-. Let K ◦- be the same formula, only with every occurrence of >– replaced by
◦– . Next, let S ◦- and S >- be the standardizations of K ◦- and K >-, respectively.
We may assume that the formula (9) from the previous section is the desequentization
of S ◦-, and hence the following formula is the desequentization of S >-:
∧
| (X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∧
| (Xs ∧ Ys → Zs) ∧
∧
|
(
(∧| P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ · · · ∧ ∧|
(
(∧| Ps → Qs)→ Rs
) → W. (17)
The fact that Int
>- 6⊢ K >-, of course, implies Int◦- 6⊢ K ◦-. This, in turn, by
Lemma 5.2, implies Int◦- 6⊢ S ◦-. Therefore, by Lemma 7.1, there is an interpretation
∗ satisfying the complexity condition of clause (b) of Theorem 3.1 such that 6|= (9)∗.
Note that (17) can be obtained from (9) through repeatedly — 3s times — replacing a
negative occurrence of a subformula ◦
|G by ∧|G. Lemmas 2.1(b) and 8.1 then guarantee
that ⊢⊢(17)→ (9), which implies |= (17)∗ → (9)∗. From here we infer that, if |= (17)∗,
then |= (9)∗, because modus ponens preserves computability. But 6|= (9)∗, and thus
6|= (17)∗. Therefore, by Lemma 8.2, 6|= (K >-)∗. Our completeness proof for Int>- is
hereby complete, and the main Theorem 3.1 of this paper is now fully proven.
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